Susan Law:
In this particular question you stated, my own answer is simply that your logic is flawed. The three characteristics are statements about the nature of one level of reality. Daniel calls them "qualities of all experience." He quotes the Buddha as saying, just before he died, "All phenomena are impermanent," and goes on to comment, "Absolute transience is truly the fundamental nature of experiential reality. What do I mean by 'experiential reality?' I mean the universe of sensations that you actually experience." My point is that Daniel is pointing to one level of reality - and defining it clearly: experienced sensations. The characteristic of impermanence itself is not an experienced sensation.
I'm not sure if this is true. I haven't experienced it yet, but I've head people talking about anicca as a bare sensation in its own right. Also at the end of his book Daniel talks about the Doors to Enlightenment as consisting only of two out of the three Characteristics. Presumably he sensed these Doors, right?
Anyway, even if Impermanence is not an experienced sensation, Buddha said that nothing exists besides the four elements and the five skandhas, with Nirvana presumably sort of hovering in the background, neither in existence nor out of it. So we could say that anicca is just a "concept" and not a sensation, but it would still be a mental formation and thus subject to impermanence itself. However, I guess we could say it is just the sensation of anicca is impermanent, it comes and goes like all other sensations, but the reality behind it remains.
As to what is it that requires all experienced phenomena to be impermanent, I would focus on the word "experienced." I think it is a function of our sensation, which either must sense change or itself change its own gaze in order to actually sense anything, rather than it being a property of the exterior world. Buddhists though would probably disagree.
It's a basic logical rule that when you apply rules or facts about one level of reality to another, you create paradoxes, falacies, and other errors. 'This statement is a lie,' is a well-known example. So the problems you find are ones that you have created by misapplying one of the three characteristics to itself.
Yes, this is known as the Liar Paradox but it only occurs in 2-valued logics. I'm not sure about much in Buddhism, but I know it's far beyond a 2-valued logic. Take for example the Buddha's statement about whether or not a Tathagata returns after death: "Neither returns, nor doesn't return, nor neither returns nor doesn't return, nor both returns and doesn't return." I think you'd need at least a 5-valued logic to make sense of that statement. Some people have interpreted that to mean his personal mindstream was at an end but that he would live on in his teachings, but he could have just said that. Of course the Buddha might just have been another one of those spiritual leaders who sounded mysterious for the sake of mystery, or to cover up flaws in his doctrine.
Within the form of Buddhism I follow, we are taught to develop wisdom from first hearing, then studying (what we hear), and then meditating (based on our understanding.) The studying part is so helpful - but a balance of all three is important.
Hmmm I think I'm stuck on the studying part!! But I am trying to meditate too. However I am not getting the impression of "no-self." As a result of meditation I do see "self" as much as an action now as a thing. "Self" seems to be the process of personal objectification. When I try the noting technique, the sensation "I am in pain" disappears and is simply replaced by "there is pain." But I also feel it was a "self" that did this and separated out from the pain, objectifying it. If the pain gets too intense, the self gets sucked back into identification with it. Meditation seems to be simply this process.
Daniel has said on here "sensations cannot observe other sensations." I wonder then what is doing the observing? He might say "nothing, it's an illusion." But to me it does not seem to be the case. I do accept that the observer only arises when there is something to observe, that there is no pure consciousness, which is in line with Buddhism (and yet there is a Jhana called "Pure Consciousness" - confusing!), but since this observer always seems to arise with the observed, I don't think it can be said not to exist, even though it does have a "flickering" existence. I think the word that best describes the relation between subject and object I am experiencing in meditation comes not from Buddhism (as far as I know, I haven't studied the Abhidharma too deeply), but continental philosophy, and that is
extimate. It means two entities utterly dependent on one another, indeed interpenetrating one another, and yet utterly distinct qualia.
Too, I wonder, what is it that knows there is flickering?
I guess there are more mysteries to investigate in meditation. I remain where I was: Intrigued by the experiences, unconvinced by the doctrine.