Sorry to spoil any enthusiasm about this which you may have developed, but with all due respect, xabir2005 does not know what he is talking about in terms of this subject's relationship to the practice of Buddhadhamma. It is very easy to be led off the path that the Buddha trod if one begins to fall for all the so-called "short cuts" that others claim to be possible avenues to awakening. This, unfortunately, is not one of them, that is,
what you seek is the nibbana of which Gotama spoke.
Anyone who has had any personal and direct insight into these matters will agree with what Ven. Analayo has written about this in his book
.
XIV-4 Nibbana: Neither All-Embracing Unity Nor Annihilation
In order further to clarify the distinctive character of the Buddha's conception of Nibbana, in the remainder of this chapter I will set it off against the realization of all-embracing unity (as envisaged by the "non-dual" religious traditions), and also against annihilationism. While early Buddhism does not deny the distinction between subject and object, it does not treat this distinction as particularly important. Both are insubstantial, the subject being nothing other than a complex of interactions with the world (object), while to speak of a "world" is to speak of what is being perceived by the subject.
Unity, in terms of subjective experience, entails a merging of the subject with the object. Experiences of this kind are often the outcome of deep levels of concentration. Nibbana, on the other hand, entails a complete giving up of both subject and object, not a merger of the two.[58] Such an experience constitutes an "escape" from the entire field of cognition.[59] Although Nibbana partakes of non-duality in so far as it has no counterpart,[60] its implications nevertheless go far beyond experiences of oneness or unity.[61]
Experiences of oneness were actually not unknown to the early Buddhist community, but even their most refined forms, experienced with the immaterial attainments, were not considered to be the final goal.[62] Just as the Buddha himself did not feel satisfied with what he had experiences based on the indications received from his first teachers,[63] so he admonished his disciples to go beyond and transcend such "transcendental" experiences.[64] Some of his disciples had achieved various non-dual experiences, while others had realized full awakening without experiencing any of the immaterial attainments.[65] The latter were the living proof that such attainments, far from being identifiable with Nibbana, are not even necessary for its realization.
In order properly to assess the early Buddhist concept of Nibbana, it needs not only to be distinguished from other views based on experiences of unity, but also has to be differentiated from the theories of annihilation held among the deterministic and materialistic schools of ancient India. On several occasions the Buddha was in fact wrongly accused of being an annihilationist.[66] His humorous reply to such allegations was that he could rightly be called so if this meant the annihilation of unwholesome states of mind.
A consideration of the discourses shows that Nibbana is described in both positive and negative terms. Negative expressions occur frequently in a practical context, indicating the work still to be done. Other passages, however, refer to Nibbana with a variety of positive epithets, calling it a state of peace, of purity, and of freedom, sublime and auspicious, wonderful and marvelous, an island, a shelter, and a refuge.[68] The happiness of freedom contingent upon having realized Nibbana constitutes the highest possible form of happiness.[69] Described as the source of supreme happiness, as a state of freedom, sublime and auspicious, Nibbana seems to have little in common with mere annihilation.
In fact, according to the Buddha's penetrating analysis the attempt to annihilate self still revolves around a sense of selfhood, though being motivated by disgust with this self. In this way annihilationism is still in bondage to a sense of self, comparable to a dog moving in circles around a post to which it is bound.[70] Such craving for non-existence (vibhavatanha) forms indeed an obstacle to the realization of Nibbana.[71] As the Dhatuvibhanga Sutta explains, to think in terms of "I shall not be" is a form of conceiving as much as the thought: "I shall be".[72] Both are to be left behind in order to proceed to awakening.
To maintain that an arahant will be annihilated at death is a misunderstanding, since such a proposition argues the annihilation of something that cannot be found in a substantial sense even while one is still alive.[73] Therefore any statement concerning the existence or annihilation of an arahant after death turns out to be meaningless.[74] What Nibbana does imply is that the ignorant belief in a substantial self is annihilated, an "annihilation" which has already taken place with stream-entry. With full awakening, then, even the subtlest traces of grasping at a sense of self are forever "annihilated", which is but a negative way of expressing the freedom gained through realization. Fully awakened to the reality of selflessness, the arahant is free indeed, like a bird in the sky, leaving no tracks.[75]
58. e.g. SN IV 100 speaks of a cessation of all six sense-spheres, an expression which the commentary explains to refer to Nibbana (Spk II 391). Another relevant reference could be the standard description of stream-entry (e.g. at SN V 423), which speaks of the insight into the fact that whatever arises will also cease, an expression that may well hint at the subjective experience of Nibbana whence all conditionally arisen phenomena cease. Similarly the declarations of realization at MN III 265 and SN IV 58 point to a cessation experience.
59. MN I 38; this "escape" from the whole field of cognition is identified by the commentary with Nibbana (Ps I 176). Similarly Thi 6 refers to Nibbana as the stilling of all cognitions.
60. The question "what is the counterpart of Nibbana?" (at MN I 304) was a question which, according to the arahant nun Dhammadinna, cannot be answered. The commentary Ps II 369 explains that Nibbana has no counterpart.
61. This much can be deduced from a statement made by the Buddha (MN II 229-33) that with the direct experience of Nibbana all views and standpoints related to an experience of unity are left behind and transcended. Cf. also SN II 77, where the Buddha rejected the view "all is one" as one of the extremes to be avoided. Furthermore, according to AN IV 40 and AN IV 401, in different celestial realms either unity or diversified experiences prevail, so that a categorical statement like "all is one" would not accord with the early Buddhist description of cosmic reality.
62. The immaterial attainments are explicitly identified with "unity" at MN III 220. In fact the whole series begins with the injunction not to pay attention to diversified cognitions as a basis for developing the sphere of infinite space (e.g. at AN IV 306), which clearly indicates the unitary character of these experiences. At MN III 106 the four immaterial attainments are again qualified as "unity" (ekatta), each of them forming part of a gradual "descent" into emptiness. The culmination of this gradual descent is reached with the destruction of the influxes (MN III 108), at which point the qualification "unity" is no longer used. This passage clearly demonstrates that full awakening goes beyond even the most refined experiences of oneness. This discourse also indicates that there may be various types of "emptiness" experiences, but that it is the complete destruction of the influxes that determines whether (or not) an experience of emptiness does indeed constitute full awakening.
63. Cf. MN I 165, where the Buddha remarked about Alara Kalama and Uddaka Ramaputta that their teaching was not conducive to complete disenchantment and therefore not sufficient to realized Nibbana.
64. e.g. MN I 455-6, where the Buddha commented on each of the meditative absorptions in turn: "this is not enough, abandon it, I say, surmount it."
65. These were the arahant "freed by wisdom", who according to their canonical definition (i.e. at MN I 477) had destroyed the influxes without having experienced the immaterial attainments.
66. Vin III 2; AN IV 174; and AN IV 183. Cf. also Vin I 234; Vin III 3; MN I 140; and AN V 190; where the Buddha is also called a "nihilist."
68. SN IV 368-73 gives a long list of such epithets. A similar but shorter list occurs at AN IV 453.
69. Nibbana as the highest happiness occurs e.g. at MN I 508; Dhp 203; Dhp 204; and Thi 476. These expressions refer to the arahant's experience of the happiness of liberation, cf. e.g. MN II 104; SN I 196; Ud 1; Ud 10; and Ud 32. The superiority of this happiness over all other types of happiness is stated at Ud 11. However, it should be pointed out that Nibbana itself is not a felt type of happiness, since with Nibbana all feelings cease. This is documented at AN IV 414, where Sariputta stated that Nibbana is happiness. When questioned how there could possibly be happiness in the absence of any feeling, he explained that for him it was precisely the absence of feeling that constituted happiness. Similarly at MN I 400 the Buddha explained that he considered even the cessation of feelings and cognitions to constitute happiness, since he did not limit the concept of "happiness" to happy feelings only. Johanssen 1969: p. 25, explains that Nibbana is " 'a source of happiness' and not 'a state of happiness.' "
70. MN II 232.
71. Since it is one of the forms of craving included in the second noble truth (cf. e.g. SN V 421)
72. MN III 246
73. At SN IV 383, the destiny of an arahant after death posed a dilemma for the monk Anuradha, which he attempted to resolve by stating that it could be described in a way other than the four standard propositions used in ancient India in such discussions. After dismissing this (according to Indian logic impossible) fifth alternative, the Buddha led Anuradha to the conclusion that even while still alive an arahant cannot be identified with any of the five aggregates or with anything outside of them. The same reasoning can be found at SN III 112, where Sariputta rebuked the monk Yamaka for presuming that arahants are annihilated at death.
74. Sn 1074 compares the arahant to a flame which, once gone out, can no longer be reckoned in terms of "flame". Sn 1076 explains that there is no measuring of one who has thus gone out, since with all phenomena removed, all pathways of language are also removed. The only acceptable declaration to be made about arahants at death (cf. DN II 109 and DN III 135) is that "they enter the Nibbana element without remainder." This declaration is further explained at It 38 to imply that in the case of an arahant passing away, all that is felt and experienced, because it is no longer delighted in, will simply cool.
75. Dhp 93 and Th 92.
