In terms of practice, Dionysus the Aeropagite and generally apophatic theology also had this way of understanding/practicing.

Etymologically speaking, Atta/Atman is also cognate with the word atom.

In modern greek, atomo means "person", as in, no more than "8 atomes of 70 kgs should ride this elevator" (not joking).

As for ontology, it seems to me that the definitive buddhist position is summed up in Nagarjuna's tetralem, the famous "neither real nor not real nor both nor neither", which is different from aristotelian logic and categories which our culture is very muched based on ; but, according to some, was recognized by Plato as the correct description of reality. Well this is anecdotal, but my understanding of this is that, questions of real existence, in the tathagatha's view, do not apply.

Real comes from latin res ("thing", as in "re-public"), which in greek is on, to on, whence on-tology comes from.

Cheers

 (edited)

I've wondered about this a bit, because in the Anatta Lakkhana Sutta (SN 22.59) the Buddha goes through each of the khandhas X and says roughly:

X is not-self. For if X were self, it wouldn't lead to affliction. And if X is impermanent, suffering and perishable, it is not fit to be regarded as self.

Reversing the logic, doesn't this imply that self (if it exists) doesn't lead to affliction and is permanent or not suffering or not perishable? Obviously it begs the question whether the self actually exists, and I believe the Buddha avoided opining on that. But even so, why would he use this logic with its implications about a putative self?

Buddha's teaching on anatta is not about whether there is a self or soul. It is about what it is helpful to think of as "me" or "mine" and what is helpful to think of as not "me" or "mine". Buddha taught that it is helpful to think of the five aggregates of clinging as anatta, as not-self, ie not "me" or "mine".

When asked is there a self/soul or is there not a self/soul, Buddha refused to answer.

What you consider self is an opinion, it is not something that is true or false, so if you find that your opinion of "self" causes suffering, let go of it.

If a computer screen is displaying something white and you look at it closely with a magnifying glass, you won't see anything white, you will see red, green, and blue pixels. If you look at self (things you think are "me" or "mine") you won't find a self, you will only find the 5 aggregates of clinging. If you look at the body you see limbs, and organs, and tissues and cells. If you think they are your self that is an opinion. If you examine the mind you find thoughts, emotions and impulses arising from unconscious process you don't control. If you think that is your self, that is also an opinion. But if you hold the opinion that the five aggregates of clinging are not-self (anatta), not "me" or "mine", then you will suffer much less.


https://accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/notself2.html

https://accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn44/sn44.010.than.html



https://accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.001.than.html

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn56/sn56.011.than.html


https://www.dhammatalks.org/ebook_index.html#selvesnotself

It sounds like you are objectifying nothing.

The original Pali scriptures show "atta" refers to "self",  "conceit" or "possessiveness", i.e, "I-making" & "my-making" or, simple, "ego".  

The Buddha had no interest in the notion of "soul", that was sometimes called "jiva". 

   Ramana maharshi's emphasis on self inqury was not to actually gain an experience of non existent "True Self" but to induce the realization of non-self. On the one hand this was rm's way of avoiding questions about the self, and on the other it was a technique to undermine the pernicious narcissism of his pesterers. Rm was a buddha, nibbana his element.


t



now, this is self inquiry...


from "on narcissism" by sig freud...


The development of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state. This departure is brought about by means of the displacement of libido on to an ego ideal imposed from without; and satisfaction is brought about from fulfilling this ideal.

At the same time the ego has sent out the libidinal object-cathexes. It becomes impoverished in favour of these cathexes, just as it does in favour of the ego ideal, and it enriches itself once more from its satisfactions in respect of the object, just as it does by fulfilling its ideal.

One part of self-regard is primary - the residue of infantile narcissism; another part arises out of the omnipotence which is corroborated by experience (the fulfilment of the ego ideal), whilst a third part proceeds from the satisfaction of object-libido.

The ego ideal has imposed severe conditions upon the satisfaction of libido through objects; for it causes some of them to be rejected by means of its censor, as being incompatible. Where no such ideal has been formed, the sexual trend in question makes its appearance unchanged in the personality in the form of a perversion. To be their own ideal once more, in regard to sexual no less than other trends, as they were in childhood - this is what people strive to attain as their happiness.

Being in love consists in a flowing-over of ego-libido on to the object. It has the power to remove repressions and re-instate perversions. It exalts the sexual object into a sexual ideal. Since, with the object type (or attachment type), being in love occurs in virtue of the fulfilment of infantile conditions for loving, we may say that whatever fulfils that condition is idealized.

The sexual ideal may enter into an interesting auxiliary relation to the ego ideal. It may be used for substitutive satisfaction where narcissistic satisfaction encounters real hindrances. In that case a person will love in conformity with the narcissistic type of object-choice, will love what he once was and no longer is, or else what possesses the excellences which he never had at all. The formula parallel to the one there stated runs thus: what possesses the excellence which the ego lacks for making it an ideal, is loved. This expedient is of special importance for the neurotic, who, on account of his excessive object-cathexes, is impoverished in his ego and is incapable of fulfilling his ego ideal. He then seeks a way back to narcissism from his prodigal expenditure of libido upon objects, by choosing a sexual ideal after the narcissistic type which possesses the excellences to which he cannot attain. This is the cure by love, which he generally prefers to cure by analysis. Indeed, he cannot believe in any other mechanism of cure; he usually brings expectations of this sort with him to the treatment and directs them towards the person of the physician. The patient’s incapacity for love, resulting from his extensive repressions, naturally stands in the way of a therapeutic plan of this kind. An unintended result is often met with when, by means of the treatment, he has been partially freed from his repressions: he withdraws from further treatment in order to choose a love-object, leaving his cure to be continued by a life with someone he loves. We might be satisfied with this result, if it did not bring with it all the dangers of a crippling dependence upon his helper in need.

Being in love consists in a flowing-over of ego-libido on to the object. It has the power to remove repressions and re-instate perversions. It exalts the sexual object into a sexual ideal. Since, with the object type (or attachment type), being in love occurs in virtue of the fulfilment of infantile conditions for loving, we may say that whatever fulfils that condition is idealized.

The ego ideal opens up an important avenue for the understanding of group psychology. In addition to its individual side, this ideal has a social side; it is also the common ideal of a family, a class or a nation. It binds not only a person’s narcissistic libido, but also a considerable amount of his homosexual libido, which is in this way turned back into the ego. The want of satisfaction which arises from the non-fulfilment of this ideal liberates homosexual libido, and this is transformed into a sense of guilt (social anxiety). Originally this sense of guilt was a fear of punishment by the parents, or, more correctly, the fear of losing their love; later the parents are replaced by an indefinite number of fellow-men. The frequent causation of paranoia by an injury to the ego, by a frustration of satisfaction within the sphere of the ego ideal, is thus made more intelligible, as is the convergence of ideal-formation and sublimation in the convergence of ideal-formation and sublimation in the ego ideal, as well as the involution of sublimations and the possible transformation of ideals in paraphrenic disorders.”