In Daniel's book he discusses experiencing agencylessness and that it would come and go until it became permanent.

I am wondering if there are traditional terms for, agencylessness, and the fact that it can be unstable?

I'm asking because if there are traditional terms I could look them up to learn more, and also it is easier to be precise if you can use the traditional term for something.

Thanks

anatta

The Sanskrit for agent is Kartā. Nagarjuna explores the insight into agencylessness by showing that there can be no inherently exististing agent.

https://tibetanbuddhistencyclopedia.com/en/images/e/e0/Nagarjuna's_Middle_Way_The_Mulamadhyamakakarika_(_PDFDrive_).pdf#page81

Really all forms of vipassana in Buddha dharma include this insight though. 

1. The Kālakārāma-sutta and Agencylessness in the Pāli Canon

a. Overview of the Kālakārāma-sutta

• Source:
  Aṅguttara-nikāya (Connected Discourses), specifically A.N. 4.24.
• Context:
  The Kālakārāma-sutta addresses misconceptions about agency, perception, and the self. It emphasizes the absence of a permanent agent behind sensory experiences and cognitive processes, aligning with the core Buddhist doctrine of anattā (non-self).

b. Original Pāli Passage and Translation

Original Passage:Translation:c. Key Pāli Terms in the Passage

The Kālakārāma-sutta systematically negates the conception of various agents involved in sensory and cognitive processes. The specific Pāli terms used for "anyone who feels," "anyone who hears," etc., are as follows:

English Phrase	Pāli Term	Breakdown	Translation
Anyone who sees	daṭṭhāraṁ	daṭṭha- (seen) + -āraṁ (agent suffix)	"one who sees"
Anyone who hears	sotāraṁ	sota- (heard) + -āraṁ (agent suffix)	"one who hears"
Anyone who feels	motāraṁ	mota- (felt) + -āraṁ (agent suffix)	"one who feels"
Anyone who understands	viññātāraṁ	viññāta- (understood) + -āraṁ (agent suffix)	"one who understands"

Understanding the Suffix "-āraṁ"

• Function:
  The suffix -āraṁ in Pāli denotes an agent or doer related to the root verb. When attached to the root of a verb, it transforms the word to signify "one who performs" the action.

Detailed Breakdown of Terms

1. daṭṭhāraṁ (one who sees)
   • daṭṭha-: Seen
   • -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
   • Meaning: "one who sees"
2. sotāraṁ (one who hears)
   • sota-: Heard
   • -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
   • Meaning: "one who hears"
3. motāraṁ (one who feels)
   • mota-: Felt
   • -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
   • Meaning: "one who feels"
4. viññātāraṁ (one who understands)
   • viññāta-: Understood
   • -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
   • Meaning: "one who understands"

d. Interpretation and Implications

• No Conception of the Perceiver:
  The Tathāgata (the Buddha) does not attribute sensory experiences or understanding to a permanent seer or agent. This aligns with the doctrine of anattā, emphasizing that what we perceive arises from interdependent conditions without a fixed self.
• No Agent Behind Perception:
  By denying the conception of an independent seer, the sutta underscores that perception and consciousness are processes devoid of a permanent agent.
• Avoidance of Duality:
  The sutta discourages dualistic thinking where a distinct "I" is separated from actions and perceptions, fostering a non-dual understanding of experience.

e. Integration with Broader Buddhist Concepts

• Dependent Origination (Pratītya-samutpāda):
  All phenomena arise dependent on conditions and cease when those conditions cease. This interdependent nature negates the need for a permanent agent behind actions.
• Five Aggregates (Khandhas):
  The self is analyzed into five aggregates: form, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness. None of these aggregates constitute a permanent self.

f. Practical Implications in Buddhist Practicei. Mindfulness and Insight (Vipassanā)

• Observation of Processes:
  Through mindfulness, practitioners observe how thoughts, sensations, and actions arise and cease without a permanent agent. This direct observation fosters insights into the impermanent and non-self nature of phenomena.
• Dissolution of Attachment:
  Recognizing the absence of a permanent self leads to the reduction of attachments and aversions, which are the root causes of suffering (dukkha).

ii. Reduction of Suffering (Dukkha)

• Understanding Impermanence:
  Grasping anattā helps practitioners understand the transient nature of experiences, thereby reducing the clinging that leads to suffering.
• Path to Liberation (Nibbāna):
  By eliminating the illusion of a permanent self, one moves closer to nibbāna, the cessation of suffering.

g. Conclusion of Kālakārāma-sutta

Analysis

The Kālakārāma-sutta serves as a profound illustration of the anattā doctrine by negating the conception of a permanent agent behind sensory and cognitive processes. By employing specific Pāli terms—daṭṭhāraṁ, sotāraṁ, motāraṁ, and viññātāraṁ—the sutta emphasizes that actions and perceptions arise dependently without a fixed self, aligning with the core Buddhist teachings on non-self and dependent origination.

2. Conceptual Attachment of Agent to Action
a. Phrase Analysis

Phrase:
"yaṁ maññati taṁ mantar"
Breakdown:

• yaṁ: "that which"
• maññati: "he thinks" or "he believes"
• taṁ: "that"
• mantar: "thinker"

Translation:
"He considers that to be the thinker."

Source:
This analysis is derived from Michael Everson's paper, "Some Remarks on Conceptualization and Transcendent Experience in the Theravāda Tradition," available at Evertype.

b. InterpretationThis phrase metaphorically represents how individuals conceptually attach a self or agent to their actions and thoughts. By considering an action as performed by a "thinker," one reinforces the illusion of a permanent self (attā), which contradicts the Buddhist understanding of anattā (non-self).

Everson elaborates:
This identification with the act of thinking exemplifies the common human tendency to attribute actions and experiences to a stable, enduring self, thereby perpetuating attachments and aversions that lead to suffering.

3. Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka

Philosophy: Agency and Agencylessness

a. Introduction to Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka

• Who is Nagarjuna?
  Nagarjuna (circa 150–250 CE) is one of the most influential Buddhist philosophers, renowned for founding the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. His seminal work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way), systematically deconstructs inherent existence and emphasizes the concept of śūnyatā (emptiness).
• What is Madhyamaka?
  Madhyamaka is a philosophical approach that navigates between the extremes of eternalism (belief in an eternal self) and nihilism (denial of all existence). It posits that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence (svabhāva) and arise dependently (pratītya-samutpāda).

b. Core Concepts: Agency and Agencylessness in Madhyamakai. Agency in Buddhist Philosophy

• Definition:
  Agency refers to the capacity of individuals (agents) to act, make choices, and initiate actions.
• In Earlier Teachings:
  Particularly in Theravāda Buddhism, agency is discussed in terms of kāraka (doer) and karma (action).

ii. Agencylessness (Anākāra)

• Definition:
  Agencylessness refers to the absence of a permanent, independent agent behind actions and processes.
• Alignment with Śūnyatā:
  In Madhyamaka, agencylessness aligns with śūnyatā, emphasizing that actions arise dependently without an inherent doer.

c. Specific Terms Used in Madhyamaka

Sanskrit Term	Pāli Equivalent	Translation	Role in Agency/Agencylessness
Kartā	Kāraka	Agent/Doer	Represents the conventional notion of an agent, deconstructed in Madhyamaka.
Śūnyatā	Suññatā	Emptiness	Emphasizes the lack of inherent existence, including agency.
Pratītya-samutpāda	Pratītya-samutpāda	Dependent Origination	Explains the interdependent arising of actions without a permanent agent.
Anātman	Anattā	Non-Self	Denies a permanent self, supporting the concept of agencylessness.

i. Kartā (कर्ता) – The Agent/Doer

• Meaning:
  "Agent" or "doer" responsible for actions.
• Usage in Madhyamaka:
  Nagarjuna employs kartā to discuss the conventional notion of an agent but ultimately denies its inherent existence.

ii. Śūnyatā (शून्यता) – Emptiness

• Meaning:
  "Emptiness" signifies the absence of inherent existence in all phenomena.
• Role in Agencylessness:
  Śūnyatā underpins the Madhyamaka assertion that there is no permanent agent behind actions; instead, actions arise dependently.

iii. Pratītya-samutpāda (प्रत्ययसमुत्पाद) – Dependent Origination

• Meaning:
  "Dependent origination" describes the interdependent nature of all phenomena.
• Implications for Agency:
  Actions and experiences arise through a web of conditions without necessitating a permanent agent.

iv. Anātman (अनात्मन्) – Non-Self

• Meaning:
  "Non-self" denotes the absence of an enduring, unchanging self.
• Relation to Agencylessness:
  Anātman complements śūnyatā by denying a permanent self that acts as an agent.

d. Madhyamaka's Approach to Agency and Agencylessness

i. Deconstruction of Inherent Agency

• Nagarjuna's Argument:
  The notion of an inherent agent (kartā) is a conceptual construct without true existence.
• Emphasis on Dependent Processes:
  Madhyamaka emphasizes that actions are processes arising from dependent conditions, not orchestrated by a permanent "doer."

ii. Emphasis on Relational Agency

• Relational and Context-Dependent:
  Instead of positing a permanent doer, Madhyamaka views agency as relational and context-dependent.
• No Need for a Singular Agent:
  Actions result from interdependent factors, eliminating the necessity for a singular, enduring agent.

iii. The Middle Way: Avoiding Dualism

• Navigating Between Extremes:
  Madhyamaka rejects both eternalism (a permanent self as the agent) and nihilism (denial of any functional agency).
• Dependent and Empty Nature:
  It posits that while agency is conventionally acknowledged, it lacks inherent existence and is devoid of a permanent self.

e. Interpretation of Agencylessness in Madhyamaka

• No Inherent Agent:
  Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy systematically deconstructs the inherent existence of agents, asserting that what we consider as an "agent" is merely a convenient label for interdependent processes.
• Dependent Origination:
  Actions and phenomena arise dependently, without an inherent doer, aligning with the broader Buddhist teachings on anattā (non-self).

f. Practical Implications in Madhyamaka

i. Emptiness (Śūnyatā)

• Understanding Emptiness:
  Recognizing the emptiness of all phenomena, including the notion of agency, helps transcend dualistic perceptions and attachments.

ii. Middle Way Philosophy

• Avoiding Extremes:
  Madhyamaka's Middle Way approach avoids the extremes of eternalism and nihilism, promoting a balanced understanding of reality as empty yet functionally interdependent.

g. Conclusion of Madhyamaka Analysis

Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy offers a profound examination of agency and agencylessness, fundamentally challenging the notion of a permanent agent behind actions. By employing terms like kartā (agent) and emphasizing śūnyatā (emptiness) and pratītya-samutpāda (dependent origination), Madhyamaka articulates a vision of reality where actions arise dependently without an inherent doer. This perspective aligns with the broader Buddhist teachings on anattā (non-self), fostering a deeper understanding that leads to the reduction of suffering and the pursuit of nibbāna (liberation).

4. Comparative Insights and Integration

While the Kālakārāma-sutta and Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy emerge from different textual traditions (Theravāda and Mahayāna, respectively), they converge on the critical Buddhist doctrines of anattā (non-self) and pratītya-samutpāda (dependent origination). Both traditions emphasize the absence of a permanent self or agent behind actions, albeit through distinct terminologies and philosophical frameworks.

a. Shared Foundations

• Anattā (Non-Self):
  Central to both the Pāli Canon and Madhyamaka, it denies the existence of a permanent, unchanging self.
• Dependent Origination (Pratītya-samutpāda):
  Both traditions uphold the principle that all phenomena arise dependently, negating the need for an inherent agent.

b. Distinct Philosophical Approaches

• Terminological Differences:
  The Pāli Canon employs Pāli terms like kāraka and suññatā, while Madhyamaka uses Sanskrit terms like kartā and śūnyatā.
• Philosophical Depth and Scope:
  Madhyamaka delves deeper into the philosophical implications of śūnyatā, extending the concept to all phenomena, including relational aspects like agency. In contrast, the Pāli Canon maintains a practical approach, focusing on doctrinal teachings to guide practitioners toward liberation.

c. Practical Applications

Both traditions utilize these doctrines to guide practitioners in their path toward nibbāna (liberation):

• Theravāda (Pāli Canon):
  Emphasizes mindfulness and insight practices to realize anattā, thereby reducing attachments and suffering.
• Madhyamaka (Nagarjuna):
  Encourages a profound philosophical understanding of śūnyatā to transcend dualistic perceptions and realize the emptiness of all phenomena, including agency.

5. Summary of Key Terms Related to Agency and Agencylessness

a. Kālakārāma-sutta (Pāli Canon)

Pāli Term	Translation	Role in Concept of Agent/No-Agent
daṭṭhāraṁ	One who sees	Represents the perceiver; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent seer.
sotāraṁ	One who hears	Represents the hearer; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent hearer.
motāraṁ	One who feels	Represents the feeler; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent feeler.
viññātāraṁ	One who understands	Represents the understander; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent understander.

b. Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka Philosophy

Sanskrit Term	Pāli Equivalent	Translation	Role in Agency/Agencylessness
Kartā	Kāraka	Agent/Doer	Represents the conventional notion of an agent, deconstructed in Madhyamaka.
Śūnyatā	Suññatā	Emptiness	Emphasizes the lack of inherent existence, including agency.
Pratītya-samutpāda	Pratītya-samutpāda	Dependent Origination	Explains the interdependent arising of actions without a permanent agent.
Anātman	Anattā	Non-Self	Denies a permanent self, supporting the concept of agencylessness.

6. Conclusion

Understanding the Buddhist concepts of agency and agencylessness is pivotal for comprehending the path to liberation (nibbāna). Both the Kālakārāma-sutta of the Pāli Canon and Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy articulate the absence of a permanent self or agent behind actions and experiences, albeit through different terminologies and philosophical lenses.

• Kālakārāma-sutta (Theravāda/Pāli Canon):
  Utilizes specific Pāli terms—daṭṭhāraṁ, sotāraṁ, motāraṁ, and viññātāraṁ—to negate the conception of permanent agents in sensory and cognitive processes, reinforcing the anattā doctrine.
• Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka (Mahayāna/Sanskrit):
  Employs Sanskrit terms—kartā, śūnyatā, pratītya-samutpāda, and anātman—to delve deeper into the emptiness (śūnyatā) of all phenomena, including agency, thereby offering a more philosophically expansive exploration of agencylessness.

By integrating insights from both traditions, practitioners can cultivate a profound understanding of the impermanent, interdependent, and non-self nature of existence, paving the way for the reduction of suffering and the attainment of true liberation.

7. References

1. Everson, Michael. Some Remarks on Conceptualization and Transcendent Experience in the Theravāda Tradition, with Two Notes on Translation. 1988. Available at: Evertype
2. Aṅguttara-nikāya. 1888. Aṅguttara-nikāya. Vol. 2. Edited by Richard Morris. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 6 vols. (1885-1910).
3. Majjhima-nikāya. 1888. Majjhima-nikāya. Vol. 1. Edited by V. Trenckner. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 4 vols. (1888-1925).
4. Nagarjuna. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way).
5. Rhys Davids, T. W., and William Stede, eds. 1979. The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary. London: Pali Text Society. [Reprint of 1925 ed.]
6. Ñāṇananda. 1974. The Magic of the Mind: An Exposition of the Kālakārāma-sutta. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society.

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https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2014/07/some-remarks-on-conceptualization-and_14.html

Some Remarks on Conceptualization and Transcendent Experience
Soh
Also see: No Self, No Doer, Conditionality

Thusness commented: "It is a good article... ...In the article there is no obsession or singling out clarity as independent and existing by itself. "Being" here is understood within/from the context of anatta, process, verb, no locus and without agent. His term of "being" is not to single out from the ever dynamics of appearance but rather understood from the standpoint of non-action. Would be better if there is integration of total exertion (dependent origination) into it; makes the article more complete."

http://www.evertype.com/misc/vitakka.html

[img alt="[Evertype]" height="33" width="34"]https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/blogger_img_proxy/AEn0k_vqsHHOvotPiFQxBDgQ_BgJFSZhTsLeBH3778AWZpbhLtCpWTS7Ez1vwS5i8kRqVk_dP5sEgBqEWtMLhicyFnV4JTZU_g6NgFHMBeMs3ztCmJE=s0-d  Some remarks on conceptualization and transcendent experience Home

Some remarks on conceptualization and transcendent experience in the Theravāda tradition, with two notes on translationMichael EversonThis paper, written originally in 1988, was an excursion into theology -- or perhaps “noetology”. It was an attempt at commentary proper, rather than at disinterested analysis. It is a basic tenet of Buddhism that suffering arises from false notions of self. Individuals perceive themselves as separate entities, autonomous yet dependent on their world, experiencing change and continuity. The uniqueness of each moment of existence is distorted by the filter of a self which categorizes and interprets those moments, judging them good or bad and fighting a useless battle to keep the good and shun the bad. The nexus for the introduction of false notions of self into experience is the point at which experience is conceptualized. Enlightened consciousness results when these false notions are no longer imposed upon the perceptual process. It cannot be said that the Buddhist description of conceptualization is without its difficulties. Indeed, a Buddhist description ofanything is much entangled in relationships: just as any event in the world depends on a nigh infinite series of causes, and engenders a nigh infinite series of effects, so does a light shone on any facet of Buddhist epistemology shine and reflect off of each other facet. It is difficult to pluck one string of the sitar without causing the sympathetic strings into resonance as well. Still, conceptualization, and its relation to conditioned and enlightened consciousness, is central to Buddhism -- both to its taxonomy of the problem of existence and to its soteriology. An investigation of that relation will suggest a reëvaluation of notions of action and being. Buddhism might be described as a kind of cure to the disease of dukkha, of ‘suffering’ or ‘unsatisfactoriness’. Existence (bhava) is an ongoing process of becoming, manifest in its constituents (aṅga). The natural (or ideal) condition for the mind is a calm flow (bhavaṅga-sota), through which (around which, in which) the constituents of becoming interact harmoniously in an “experiential stream” of what is as it is. Nyanatiloka remarks that bhavṣaṅga-sota is explained in the Abhidhamma commentaries as the foundation or condition (kaṁraṇa) of existence (bhava), as the sine qua non of life, having the nature of a process, lit. a flux or stream (sota). [Nyanatiloka 1980:38] Conceptualization impedes the harmonious flow of bhavaṅga-sota. It is a process for ordering stimuli to consciousness, convenient for interaction with the world, but, apparently, not essential once the world has been investigated. Bondage to concepts is considered to be an inevitable consequence of the process of conceptualization because of the fiction of the self, and that bondage to concepts leads to expectation and denial, the causes of dukkha. A review of the process leading up to conceptualization will be helpful here. The immediate precursors to conceptualization have been classified as a purely impersonal, causal process. In the Madhupiṇḍika-sutta, the venerable Kaccaṁna sums up his understanding of the Buddha’s teaching: Manañ-c’ āvuso paṭicca dhamme ca uppajjati manoviññāṇaṁ, tiṇṇaṁ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṁ vedeti taṁ sañjānāti, yaṁ sañjānāti taṁ vitakketi, yaṁ vitakketi taṁ papañceti, yaṁ papañceti tatonidānaṁ purisaṁ papañcasaññāsaṅkhā samu-dācaranti atītānāgatapaccuppanesu manoviññeyyesu dhammesu. [Majjhima-nikāya 18 (Madhupiṇḍika-sutta) (1888: I:112)] ‘And, brothers, the mind and mental objects are the cause for the arising of mental consciousness. The meeting of the three is sense contact; feelings are the result of that contact; what one feels one perceives; what one perceives one reasons about; what one reasons about one differentiates; what one differentiates is the origin of the sign of perceptions and obstructions which assail a man with regard to mental objects to be comprehended by the mind, in the past, the future, and the present.’ Interaction between one of the sense-bases (the five senses and the mind) and an object gives rise to the attentive faculty of consciousness, that is, of awareness of objects. The meeting of the three is contact (phassa); from this contact arises sensation or feeling (vedanā). The living being with functioning sense organs must interact with objects, become conscious of them through contact, and feel or sense them. When the ego intrudes and makes the connection “I experience this object”, the process loses its impersonality, and becomes first a kind of deliberate and conscious, then a subconscious and automatic activity, conditioned by karmic predisposition. Kaccāna’s description points to this shift from impersonal to personal in his movement from a simple ablative construction to the inflected personal verb: “Phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṁ vedeti taṁ sañjānāti” ‘From the condition of contact [arises] feeling; what one feels, one perceives’. Suddenly it is an individual person (puggala) who experiences sensation; and when he does, he perceives, knows, or recognizes (compare sañjānāti with Latin cōgnōscit). A person has arisen here out of nonperson: attā out ofanattā. That ego, once established with its faculties of memory and volition, will evaluate its sensations in terms of itself; it will judge, and desire. That ego is a confluence of material and mental processes, and, apart from them, has no real existence. Conceptualization arises from perception. “Yaṁ sañjānāti taṁ vitakketi” ‘What one perceives, one reflects on’. This is indicative of the insidious nature of the ego to take the original subjective experience and “objectivize” it. Though each object, contact, and sensation be unique, the ego takes them only in relation to itself and its past, present, and future experience and needs. The concepts (vitakkā) which arise through perception tend toward proliferation, for the ego becomes attached to them. Conceptions become preconceptions, and the whole scheme is filled with error. The Buddha was concerned about the detrimental nature of attachment to speculative views of existence and of the Transcendent. The problem is not whether or not the views themselves have validity, for it is clear that they do, depending on, and with respect to, the particular point of view. “The fact that existence is a relative concept is often overlooked by the worldling.” [Ñāṇananda 1974:20] It is axiomatic that the frog knows what the tadpole cannot; but the question here is whether or not the tadpole’s point of view is wise, and the Buddhist approach would be to say that no point of view is worthwhile unless it is a view which encompasses reality as it is. That view is impersonal. From the Sutta-nipāta: “Mūlaṁ papañcasaṁkhāyā” ti Bhagavā “‘mantā asmī ’ti sabbam uparundhe, yā kāci taṇhā ajjhattaṁ, tāsaṁ vinayā sadā sato sikkhe.” [916 (1913:179)] ‘“He should”, said the Lord, “break up the root of these signs of obstruction,[1] the notion ‘I am the thinker’. Whatever his subjective desires, he trains himself to give them up, always mindful in his discipline.”’ It should be noted that both E. M. Hare [Sutta-nipāta 1944:134] and Hammalava Saddhatissa [Sutta-nipāta 1985:107] have mistranslated mantā asmi as ‘all the thoughts “I am”’ and ‘all thought of “I am”’ respectively. A better reading would have mantā <mantar ‘thinker’ (< Sanskrit *mantṛ) and take the deictic ’ti as setting off the phrase mantā asmi as translated above. (Cf. Neumann’s translation “Ich bin’s, der denkt”, ‘I am the one who thinks’. [Sutta-nipāta 1911:299]) The Commentary to the Sutta-nipāta, however, explains this phrase by mantāya: ...tassā [papañcāya] avijjādayo kilesā mūlaṁ, taṁ papañcasaṁkhāya mūlaṁ ‘asmī’ ti pavattamānañ ca sabbaṁ mantāyauparundhe, yā kāci ajjhattaṁ taṇhā uppajjeyyuṁ, tāsam vinayāya sadā sato sikkhe upaṭṭhitasati hutvā sikkheyyā ti. [Paramatthajotikā II.iv.14 (1917:II:562)] {My emphasis.} ‘...from this [obstruction] comes the root, the impurities which begin with ignorance: this root of the signs of obstruction is ‘I am’, which results in pride, and he should break up all [this] by wisdom, whatever the subjective desires that should arise, for/of these he trains himself to give up, ever mindful, he should discipline himself, being one whose attention is firm.’ Here the dative mantāya would also prove difficult for Hare and Saddhatissa’s readings, where we should expect *manā asmi (formanāya asmi) ‘of the thought “I am”, since we have mano ‘thought’ opposed to mantā ‘wisdom’, as I think the Commentary has it, or even manta (< Sanskrit mantra) ‘charm, doctrine, Holy Scripture’. [Cf. Childers 1875:238-39, and Rhys Davids & Stede 1979:520-22] In any case, I find the present suggested reading more in keeping with the spirit and the sense of the intent of the text, and with the goals of the tradition generally.[2] It is the conceptual attachment of agent to action (yaṁ maññati taṁ mantar), resulting from the initial separation of agent from action, which the Buddha attacks in the Kālakārāma-sutta, not whether or not there exists a thinker at all. It is true that identification with (or even the ‘real’ existence of) the personal ego is denied elsewhere by the Buddha: ...sutavato ariyasāvakassa avijjā pahīyati vijjā uppajjati. Tassa avijjāvirāgā vijjuppādā “Asmī” ti pi ’ssa na hoti, “Ayam aham asmī” ti pi ’ssa na hoti, “Bhavissanti, na bhavissanti, rūpī, arūpī, saññī, asaññī, n’eva saññī nāsaññī bhavissan”  ti pi ’ssa na hoti. [Saṁyutta-nikāya XXII.47.6-7 (Atthadīpa-vagga) (1890:III:46-47)] {My punctuation.} ‘...for the noble learned disciple, ignorance is abandoned and knowledge arises. From this cleansing of ignorance and coming into existence of knowledge, his “I am” is no more, his “This I exists” is no more, his “I will be, I will not be, I will have form, I will not have form, I will be conscious, I will be unconscious, I will be neither conscious nor unconscious” is no more.’ Yet there is no suggestion that a universal (albeit Vedāntist) ontological interpretation of aham asmi ‘I am’ would be rejected, though such a rejection could be inferred, I think, in the readings of Hare and Saddhatissa. J. G. Jennings has remarked that “[t]he an-attadoctrine so strongly emphasized by [Gotama] declares the transience of individuality, yet insists upon an ultimate or fundamental unity”. [1974:571] While the Pāli commentarial tradition would doubtless reject a Vedāntist claim of an essential unity to Reality, I see no reason to think that a radically non-attached, Liberated notion of “I am” is instrinsically inconsistent with Buddhist teachings. Pure being is neither conceived nor attached, It just Is, and if there is for “me” only “being”, then, it seems, “I am”.[3] The conceptual attachment of agent to action results from an initial (erroneous) separation of agent from action. The source of the delusion standing in the way of Liberation (papañcasaṁkhā) is the personal notion “I am a thinker” (mantā asmi). Mindfulness is the method by which one learns the process of letting go (vinaya); that process begins with the elimination of attachment to the things perceived (pleasure, pain, desire, dislike) and culminates in the elimination of attachment to the identification with the notion that there is in fact a perceiver apart from the perception. This process of detachment from ego is admittedly difficult to describe, and it may be fruitless to attempt to do so. What may be more fruitful is to investigate the effects precipitated by that process. By and large, they derive from a fundamental revision of the process leading up to conceptualization, and from the removal of the causes leading to conceptual proliferation and egoistic “ownership” of experience. The Sutta-nipātadescribes the one who has managed this: “Sa sabbadhammesu visenibhūto, yaṁ kiñci diṭṭhaṁ va sutaṁ mutaṁ vā, sa pannabhāro muni vippayutto na kappiyo nūparato na patthiyo” ti Bhagavā ti.  [914 (1913:178)] ‘“He who has discarded all theories about anything seen or heard or conceived is a monk who is enlightened and liberated; there is no rule, no abstention, no desire for himself”, said the Lord.’ He is ‘disarmed’ (visenibhūta) with respect to all views based on what has been seen, heard, or conceived; he is liberated, has laid down his burden (pannabhāro, having, perhaps, “enlightened” his load!), and is without desire. There is no self to be concerned for. What is the character of the impersonal viewpoint? In the Kālakārāma-sutta, transcendent experience is characterized quite comprehensively: Iti kho bhikkhave Tathāgato daṭṭhā [diṭṭhā  in Burmese MSS] daṭṭhabbaṁ diṭṭhaṁ na maññati adiṭṭhaṁ na maññati daṭṭhabbaṁ na maññati daṭṭhāraṁ na maññati, sutvā sotabbaṁ sutaṁ na maññati asutaṁ na maññati sotabbaṁ na maññati sotāraṁ na maññati, mutvā motabbaṁ mutam [sic] na maññati amutaṁ na maññati mottabaṁ [sic] na maññati motāraṁ na maññati, viññātvā viññātabbaṁ viññātaṁ na maññati aviññātaṁ na maññati viññātabbaṁ na maññati viññātāraṁ na maññati. [Aṅguttara-nikāya 4:24 (Kālakārāma-sutta) (1888: II:25)] ‘Thus, O monks, the Tathāgata, having seen whatever is to be seen, does not conceive of what is seen; he does not conceive of what has not been seen; he does not conceive of that which must yet be seen; he does not conceive of anyone who sees. Having heard whatever is to be heard, he does not conceive of what is heard; he does not conceive of what has not been heard; he does not conceive of that which must yet be heard; he does not conceive of anyone who hears. Having felt whatever is to be felt, he does not conceive of what is felt; he does not conceive of what has not been felt; he does not conceive of that which must yet be felt; he does not conceive of anyone who feels. Having understood whatever is to be understood, he does not conceive of what is understood; he does not conceive of what has not been understood; he does not conceive of that which must yet be understood; he does not conceive of anyone who understands.’ Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda’s translation of this passage proves problematic. [1974:9-11] For the sake of brevity and simplicity, I will make a neutral reconstruction of this passage using just the verb karoti ‘to do’ as an example, since it is first the construction which is in question. “Iti kho bhikkhave katvā kātabbaṁ kataṁ na maññati akataṁ na maññati kātabbaṁ na maññati kattaraṁ na maññati.”Ñāṇananda would translate this so: “A Tathāgata does not conceive of a thing to be done as apart from doing; he does not conceive of ‘an undone’; he does not conceive of a ‘thing-worth-doing’, he does not conceive about a doer.” This “thing to be done apart from doing” is offered by Ñāṇananda as an alternative to the sense given in Buddhaghosa’s Commentary to the Aṅguttara-nikāya, which, according to Ñāṇananda, takes the words ‘[katvā kātabbaṁ]’ in the text to mean ‘having [done], should be [done]’, and explains the following words ‘[kataṁ] na maññati’ as a separate phrase meaning that the Tathāgata does not entertain any cravings, conceits, or views, thinking: ‘I am [doing] that which has been [done] by the people’. It applies the same mode of explanation throughout. [1974:10 n.1] (Buddhaghosa’s original reads Daṭṭhā daṭṭhabban  ti disvā daṭṭhabbaṁ. Diṭṭhaṁ na maññatī ti taṁ diṭṭhaṁ rūpāyatanaṁ ahaṁ mahājanena diṭṭham eva passāmī ti taṇhāmānadiṭṭhīhi na maññati. [IV.iii.4 (1936: III:39)] ‘Daṭṭhā daṭṭhabbaṁ means “having seen what is to be seen”. Diṭṭhaṁ na maññati means “I see the thing seen which is even seen by the people”; one does not conceive {of it} by desires or conceits or opinions’ [i.e., he does not conceptualize about it].) Ñāṇananda prefers to treat the formally ambiguous daṭṭhā/diṭṭhā as ablative of the past participle (so katā from kata) “giving the sense: ‘as apart from [doing]’; and, ‘[kātabbaṁ kataṁ]’ taken together, would mean ‘a [do-able] thing’.” He suggests that the absolutive forms sutvā, mutvā, and viññātvā are “probably a re-correction following the commentarial explanation”, and that the ablatives suttā, mutā, and viññātā evince the most correct reading. [Ñāṇananda 1974:10 n.1] I am not certain that his revision is necessary. F. L. Woodward’s translation seems to follow Buddhaghosa with respect to the verbs suṇāti, maññati, and vijānāti: “[Doing] what is to be [done], he has no conceit of what has been [done] or not [done] or is to be [done], he has no conceit of the [doer]”; but he readsdaṭṭhā as the nomen agentis: “[A] Tathāgata is a seer of what is seen, but he has no conceit of what is seen”. [1933:27] Following Buddhaghosa, I would suggest that “Tathāgato katvā kātabbaṁ kataṁ na maññati” etc. should read ‘Having done what is to be done, the Tathāgata does not conceive of what is done; he does not conceive of the undone; he does not conceive of that which must yet be done; he does not conceive of a doer’. ‘Conceive’ (maññati) here means ‘to make a concept of’. Important too is the translation here of kātabbaṁ. There is really no reason to suggest that Buddhaghosa would have the gerundive be taken in an obligatory sense ‘should be done’, or the valued (read judged!) sense of ‘a thing-worth-doing’, as Ñāṇananda has taken it. [1974:10-11, 10 n.1] The context does not require that the form be understood as a participium necessitatis, but only as a future passive participle. According to Manfred Mayrhofer, the meaning of the future passive participle “ist die des ‘in Zukunft getan werden müssenden’”, ‘is that of “that which must yet be done”’. [1951:174] Ñāṇananda’s obligatory “should” is unnecessary, for the deed which “is to be done” comes about through the exigencies of causality. That the Tathāgata is beyond causality is not taken into consideration by the forms of Pāli grammar, but he is nonetheless certainly free from obligation and evaluation. The deeds of most individuals are causally effected, and the point of the text is that once a deed is done, the Tathāgata is no longer concerned with it, or with the deed undone, or the deed yet to do, or the doer. He is concerned only with the doing, and only in the moment in which it is done. It is fairly easy to see that Ñāṇananda’s “thing to be done as apart from doing” is an attempt at just such an understanding, though I think the textual revision of absolutive to ablative is unnecessary. What is there, then? Just seeing, hearing, feeling, or understanding. There is no agent, no patient, no recipient, no locus: only the verb, the process, or rather, the proceeding. To be enlightened is not to be or to do any thing: it is only being, or doing. This is admittedly circular, and it is proverbial to any student of mysticism--and certainly recognized by the Buddhist tradition itself--that little can besaid which can give any real sense of what goes on in transformed consciousness. Buddhism offers nonetheless its own kind of description, always tending toward the practical, toward the causes which will bring about the Liberation itself: that is, toward the empiric. The path to Liberation is twofold: moving away from deluded action, and moving toward wise action. It is all the more significant for its corollary that the entire process [of cause and effect] could be made to cease progressively by applying the proper means. Negatively put, the spiritual endeavor to end all suffering, is a process of ‘starving’ the conditions of their respective ‘nutriments’ (āhārā), as indicated by the latter half of the formula of Dependent Arising. However, there are enough instances in the Pāli Canon to show that it is quite legitimate to conceive this receding process too, positively as a progress in terms of wholesome mental states. [Ñāṇananda 1974:46-47] The eradication of conceptualization and the cultivation of a dispassionate, impersonal observation is the key to Liberation. “Ever-becoming and ever-ceasing-to-be are endless action.... Ceaseless action is the Universe.” [Merrell-Wolff 1973:247] Since the being embodied must be a part of such action, his hope must be to loose himself from the bounds of causal action: he must seek Liberation. Perhaps it is not so ironic that in order to do so, he must realize that there is nothing but action; for then he is, so says the Buddha, free.Notes[1] I prefer here the reading of papañca as ‘obstruction’ or ‘hinderance’ to the commonly met with ‘obsession’. Here I follow Rhys Davies’ suggestion that papañca is at least semantically related to *papadya ‘what is in front of the feet’, where he compares Latinimpedimentum (though Sanskrit prapadya should give Pāli papajja). [Rhys Davies 1979:412] An obsession is an obstruction, but not all obstructions are obsessions. Cf. also above, in the passage taken from the Madhupiṇḍika-sutta, where papañceti is taken in its sense as derived from Sanskrit prapañcayati ‘to describe at length’, from prapañca ‘diversity’. Back to text. [2] Robert Buswell has pointed out to me that Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda has arrived at the same conclusion. [Ñāṇananda 1971:31] Back to text. [3] Without really trying to second-guess the Tathāgata, the argument here is simply that he might recognize a distinction in the semantics of aham asmi with respect to his own description of the Enlightenment, and that of the Vedāntists. (He would almost certainly reject the use of such metaphor for paedagogical purposes, however.) Jennings is right to point out that the Vedāntist schools and their concepts of, for example, māyā, contributed to the Buddha’s own teachings. [Jennings 1974:cix-cx] Certainly, it can be said that useful comparison can be made between the Buddhist and Vedāntist traditions if such semantic differences are reconciled. Fundamental unities are realized in the Buddhist tradition at least insofar as the alienation of attāand anattā are concerned (Cf. the remarks on bhavaṅga-sota above.). Back to text.ReferencesAṅguttara-nikāya. 1888. Aṅguttara-nikāya. Vol. 2. Edited by Richard Morris. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 6 vols. (1885-1910). Aṅguttara-nikāya. 1933. The book of the Gradual Sayings. Vol. 2: The book of the Fours. Translated by F.L. Woodward. London: Oxford University Press for the Pali Text Society. Buddhaghosa. 1936. Manorathapūraṇī: commentary on the Aṅguttara-nikāya. Vol. 3. Edited by Hermann Kopp. London: Oxford University Press for the Pali Text Society. 5 vols. (1924-1956). Childers, Robert Cæsar. 1875. A dictionary of the Pali language. London: Trübner & Co. Jennings, J. G. 1974. The Vedāntic Buddhism of the Buddha: a collection of historical texts translated [and edited] from the original Pāli. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. [Reprint of 1947 ed.] Majjhima-nikāya.. 1888. Majjhima-nikāya. Vol. 1. Edited by V. Trenckner. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 4 vols. (1888-1925). Mayrhofer, Manfred. 1951. Handbuch des Pāli, mit Texten und Glossar: eine Einführung in das sprachwissenschaftliche Studium des Mittelindischen. 1. Teil: Grammatik. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag. Merrell-Wolff, Franklin. 1973 The philosophy of consciousness-without-an-object: reflections on the nature of transcendental consciousness. New York: Julian Press. Ñāṇananda. 1971. Concept and reality in early Buddhist thought. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society. Ñāṇananda. 1974. The magic of the mind: an exposition of the Kālakārāma-sutta. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society. Nyanatiloka. 1980. Buddhist dictionary: manual of Buddhist terms and doctrines. 4th edition, revised by Nyanaponika. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society. Paramatthajotikā. 1917. Sutta-nipāta commentary: being Paramatthajotikā II. Vol. 2. Edited by Helmer Smith. London: Humphrey Milford for the Pali Text Society. 3 vols. (1916-1917). Rhys Davies, T. W., and William Stede, eds. 1979. The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English dictionary. London: Pali Text Society. [Reprint of 1925 ed.] Saṁyutta-nikāya. 1890. Saṁyutta-nikāya. Edited by Leon Feer. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 3 vols. (1888-1890). Sutta-nipāta. 1911. Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos aus der Sammlung der Bruchstücke Suttanipāto des Pāli-Kanons. Translated by Karl Eugen Neumann. München: R. Piper & Co. Sutta-nipāta. 1913. Sutta-nipāta. Edited by Dines Andersen and Helmer Smith. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. Sutta-nipāta. 1944. Woven cadences of early Buddhists. Translated by E. M. Hare. London: Humphrey Milford for the Pali Text Society. Sutta-nipāta. 1985. The Sutta-nipāta. Translated by Hammalava Saddhatissa. London: Curzon Press.

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Labels: Action, Anatta, Buddha, Michael Everson, Non Dual, Proliferation 0 comments | | 


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Great Resource of Buddha's Teachings
Soh
Also see:

The Meaning of Nirvana
The Deathless in Buddhadharma?
What is Nirvana?



Update: The site has been taken down. But a copy of it is available on Box.com or Scribd here: https://app.box.com/s/nxby5606lbaei9oudiz6xsyrdasacqph / https://www.scribd.com/document/274168728/Measureless-Mind


When I discovered the site Measureless Mind, I thought, wow, what a great resource of Buddha's teachings! It is a very valuable resource for all practitioners. Very well formatted, well presented, all-rounded, well commented resource of Buddha's original teachings in the Pali canon by Geoff (online nick: jnana in dharmawheel, or nana in dhammawheel). Like Loppon Namdrol/Malcolm who I often quoted from, Geoff (whose practice background is more of Mahamudra and Theravada) is also a very knowledgeable Buddhist scholar-practitioner and I often read his posts with much interest.

I sent Thusness two of the many articles (I spent time to read the entire website from beginning to end and highly recommend others to do so) and Thusness also commented, "Both the articles are very well written. Put in the blog." and "that site is a great resource."

http://measurelessmind.ca/anattasanna.html
The Recognition of Selflessness (Anattasaññā)The contemplation of selflessness is given in AN 10.60 Girimānanda Sutta:
In practice, we need to be able to recognize this absence of self in our immediate experience: When seeing, there is the coming together of visible form, the eye, and visual consciousness. When hearing, there is the coming together of sound, the ear, and auditory consciousness. When touching, there is the coming together of tactual sensation, the body, and tactile consciousness. When thinking, there is the thought, the mind, and mental consciousness. These processes arise simply through ‘contact.’ When a sense faculty and a sensory object make contact, the corresponding sensory consciousness arises. This entire process occurs through specific conditionality (idappaccayatā). There is no independent, fully autonomous agent or self controlling any of this.
An independent, autonomous self would, by definition, be:

1. permanent
2. satisfactory
3. not prone to dis-ease
4. fully self-determining (be in complete autonomous control of itself)

Thus, what is being negated is a permanent, satisfactory self which is not prone to old age, sickness, and death. As SN 22.59 Pañcavaggiya Sutta (abridged) states:
This criterion of dis-ease is the context for the following statement that:
By engaging in sustained, dedicated contemplation we find only impermanent processes, conditionally arisen, and not fully self-determining. First we clearly see that all conditioned phenomena of body and mind are impermanent. Next we come to see that whatever is impermanent is unsatisfactory in that it can provide no lasting happiness. Then we realize that all impermanent, unsatisfactory phenomena of body and mind are not-self — they can’t be the basis for a self, which by definition would be permanent and (one would hope) satisfactory. This relationship between the recognition of impermanence, the recognition of unsatisfactoriness, and the recognition of selflessness is illustrated in the following diagram.

With the recognition of selflessness there is an emptying out of both the “subject” and “object” aspects of experience. We come to understand that “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to the mind and body as well as all external representations is deluded. When the recognition of selflessness is fully developed there is no longer any reification of substantial referents to be experienced in relation to subjective grasping. Whatever is seen is merely the seen (diṭṭhamatta). Whatever is heard or sensed is merely the heard (sutamatta) and merely the sensed (mutamatta). Whatever is known is merely the known (viññātamatta). This is explained in Ud 1.10 Bāhiya Sutta:
When there is no self to be found one’s experience becomes very simple, direct, and uncluttered. When seeing, there is the coming together of visible form, the eye, and visual consciousness, that’s all. There is no separate “seer.” The seer is entirely dependent upon the seen. There can be no seer independent of the seen. There is no separate, independent subject or self.
This is also the case for the sensory object. The “seen” is entirely dependent upon the eye faculty and visual consciousness. There can be no object seen independent of the eye faculty and cognition. This is the case for all possible sensory objects. There is no separate, independent sensory object.
The same holds true for sensory consciousness as well. “Seeing” is entirely dependent upon the eye and visible form. There can be no seeing independent of the eye and cognition. This is the case for all possible sensory cognitions. There is no separate, independent sensory consciousness.
It’s important to understand this experientially. Let’s take the straightforward empirical experience of you looking at this screen right now as an example. Conventionally speaking, you could describe the experience as “I see the computer screen.” Another way of describing this is that there’s a “seer” who “sees” the “seen.” But look at the screen: are there really three independent and separate parts to your experience? Or are “seer,” “sees,” and “seen,” just three conceptual labels applied to this experience in which the three parts are entirely interdependent?
The “seer,” “seen,” and “seeing” are all empty and insubstantial. The eye faculty, visible form, and visual consciousness are all interdependent aspects of the same experience. You can’t peel one away and still have a sensory experience — there is no separation. AN 4.24 Kāḷakārāma Sutta:
Sensory consciousness can’t be isolated as separate and independent. Nor can any of these other interdependent phenomena. Even the designations that we apply to these various phenomena are entirely conventional, dependent designations. But this doesn’t mean that we should now interpret our experience as being some sort of cosmic oneness or unity consciousness or whatever one may want to call it. That's just another empty, dependent label isn’t it? The whole point of this analysis is to see the emptiness of all referents, and thereby stop constructing and defining a “self.”
The purpose of correctly engaging in the contemplation of selflessness is stated in AN 7.49 Dutiyasaññā Sutta:
Here we get to the heart of the matter, which is one of the most subtle aspects of the Buddhadhamma. Simply stated: when ignorance ceases, belief in self simultaneously ceases. And when there is no self to be found, then there is no self to die or take birth. This right here is “death-free.” And it is precisely this that the Buddha is declaring when he says to Mogharāja:
When one completely abandons the underlying tendencies which give rise to mistaken apprehensions of a self — any and all notions of “I am” — then there is no self to die. This stilling of the “currents of conceiving” over one’s imagined self, and the resulting peace that is empty of birth, aging, and death, is straightforwardly presented in MN 140 Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta:
Truly, “a sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die.” In this way, when ignorance ceases, the entire complex of conditioned arising bound up with dissatisfaction also ceases. When all traces of “I-making” and “mine-making” are abandoned through the fully integrated threefold training of ethical conduct, meditation, and discernment, just this is dispassion (virāga). Just this is cessation (nirodha). Just this is extinguishment (nibbāna). Just this is without outflows (anāsava). Just this is not-born (ajāta), not-become (abhūta), not-made (akata), not-fabricated (asaṅkhata), endless (ananta), indestructible (apalokita), and yes, death-free (amata). It is freedom (mutti).

The Recognition of Selflessness and the Seven Factors of Awakening (Satta Bojjhaṅgā)Sustained, dedicated practice of the recognition of selflessness will gradually create the optimal conditions for the arising of all seven factors of awakening. SN 46.73 Anatta Sutta (abridged):

http://measurelessmind.ca/nirodhasanna.html

The Recognition of Cessation (Nirodhasaññā)When the recognition of dispassion is fully developed and realized, and with no self to be found, nothing to be identified with, one realizes the gnosis and vision of liberation (vimuttiñāṇadassana). This is non-referential inner peace (ajjhattasanti). This is the full recognition of cessation. AN 10.60 Girimānanda Sutta:
This is the complete absence of agitation (calita natthi). Ud 8.4 Nibbāna Sutta:
This is the calming of all specific fabrication and volitional intention. MN 140 Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta:
This is the freedom of absence which is revealed through the complete recognition of selflessness. Ud 1.10 Bāhiya Sutta:
This is noble liberation which is the elimination of craving and clinging. MN 106 Āneñjasappāya Sutta:
This is the effortless clarity of consciousness which is non-abiding and not established (appatiṭṭha viññāṇa). SN 22.53 Upaya Sutta:
There is no more seeking of any kind. There is no more personal agenda. There is no identifying with any phenomena or turning anything into a fixed reference point. There is no “here” nor “beyond” nor “between-the-two.”
The awakened mind is measureless (appamāṇacetasa), free from any sort of measuring (pamāṇa). In evocative terms, an awakened one is deep (gambhīra), boundless (appameyya), and fathomless (duppariyogāḷha). Utterly free from any reference to specifically fabricated consciousness (viññāṇasaṅkhayavimutta). “Gone” (atthaṅgata), the measureless mind is untraceable (ananuvejja) even here and now. It doesn’t abide in the head, or in the body, or anywhere else for that matter. It doesn’t have size or shape. It’s not an object or a subject.
Just as the sky is formless and non-illustrative, the measureless mind is non-illustrative and non-indicative (anidassana). This effortless clarity is unmediated by any specific fabrication or volitional intention. It is unaffected knowing: The seen is merely the seen (diṭṭhamatta). The heard is merely the heard (sutamatta). The sensed is merely the sensed (mutamatta). The known is merely the known (viññātamatta). But there is no you there. Of course, this liberating gnosis and vision can’t adequately be pointed out or indicated by words alone. It is to be individually experienced (paccatta veditabba).

The Recognition of Cessation and the Seven Factors of Awakening (Satta Bojjhaṅgā)Sustained, dedicated practice of the recognition of cessation will gradually create the optimal conditions for the arising of all seven factors of awakening. SN 46.76 Nirodha Sutta (abridged):


Labels: Anatta, Buddha, Dropping, Theravada | 

For stable agencylessness, insight into no agent and anatman or no self/Self must arise as seal realization.

https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2021/07/anatta-is-dharma-seal-or-truth-that-is.html

Anatta is a Dharma Seal or Truth that is Always Already So, Anatta is Not a State
Soh
Wrote in 2018：

"If someone talks about an experience he/she had and then lost it, that's not (the true, deep) awakening... As many teachers put it, it's the great samadhi without entry and exit.

John Tan: There is no entry and exit. Especially for no-self. Why is there no entry and exit?
Me (Soh): Anatta (no-self) is always so, not a stage to attain. So it's about realisation and shift of perception.
John Tan: Yes (thumbs up)




As John also used to say to someone else, "Insight that 'anatta' is a seal and not a stage must arise to further progress into the 'effortless' mode. That is, anatta is the ground of all experiences and has always been so, no I. In seeing, always only seen, in hearing always only sound and in thinking, always only thoughts. No effort required and never was there an 'I'.""

Also：

Differentiate Wisdom from Art


Replying to someone in Rinzai Zen discussion group, John Tan wrote recently:


“I think we have to differentiate wisdom from an art or a state of mind.
In Master Sheng Yen’s death poem, 
 
Busy with nothing till old. (无事忙中老)
In emptiness, there is weeping and laughing. (空里有哭笑)
Originally there never was any 'I'. (本来没有我)
Thus life and death can be cast aside. (生死皆可抛)
 
This "Originally there never was any 'I'" is wisdom and the dharma seal of anatta. It is neither an art like an artist in zone where self is dissolved into the flow of action nor is it a state to be achieved in the case of the taoist "坐忘" (sit and forget) -- a state of no-mind. 
 
For example in cooking, there is no self that cooks, only the activity of cooking. The hands moves, the utensils act, the water boils, the potatoes peel and the universe sings together in the act of cooking. Whether one appears clumsy or smooth in act of cooking doesn't matter and when the dishes r out, they may still taste horrible; still there never was any "I" in any moment of the activity. There is no entry or exit point in the wisdom of anatta.”
Labels: Anatta, Zen Master Sheng-yen 1 comments | | 

Soh wrote in 2007 based on what John Tan wrote:

First I do not see Anatta as merely a freeing from personality sort of experience as you mentioned; I see it as that a self/agent, a doer, a thinker, a watcher, etc, cannot be found apart from the moment to moment flow of manifestation or as its commonly expressed as ‘the observer is the observed’; there is no self apart from arising and passing. A very important point here is that Anatta/No-Self is a Dharma Seal, it is the nature of Reality all the time -- and not merely as a state free from personality, ego or the ‘small self’ or a stage to attain. This means that it does not depend on the level of achievement of a practitioner to experience anatta but Reality has always been Anatta and what is important here is the intuitive insight into it as the nature, characteristic, of phenomenon (dharma seal).

To put further emphasis on the importance of this point, I would like to borrow from the Bahiya Sutta (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.1.10.irel.html) that ‘in the seeing, there is just the seen, no seer’, ‘in the hearing, there is just the heard, no hearer’ as an illustration. When a person says that I have gone beyond the experiences from ‘I hear sound’ to a stage of ‘becoming sound’, he is mistaken. When it is taken to be a stage, it is illusory. For in actual case, there is and always is only sound when hearing; never was there a hearer to begin with. Nothing attained for it is always so. This is the seal of no-self. Therefore to a non dualist, the practice is in understanding the illusionary views of the sense of self and the split. Before the awakening of prajna wisdom, there will always be an unknowing attempt to maintain a purest state of 'presence'. This purest presence is the 'how' of a dualistic mind -- its dualistic attempt to provide a solution due to its lack of clarity of the spontaneous nature of the unconditioned. It is critical to note here that both the doubts/confusions/searches and the solutions that are created for these doubts/confusions/searches actually derive from the same cause -- our karmic propensities of ever seeing things dualistically.



John Tan adds: "This is the seal of no-self and can be realized and experienced in all moments; not just a mere concept."
 

Labels: Anatta | 

excerpt from https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2023/11/no-agent-but-there-is-choosing.html

"
Zen Master Thich Nhat Hanh:

"When we say it's raining, we mean that raining is taking place. You don't need someone up above to perform the raining. It's not that there is the rain, and there is the one who causes the rain to fall. In fact, when you say the rain is falling, it's very funny, because if it weren't falling, it wouldn't be rain. In our way of speaking, we're used to having a subject and a verb. That's why we need the word "it" when we say, "it rains." "It" is the subject, the one who makes the rain possible. But, looking deeply, we don't need a "rainer," we just need the rain. Raining and the rain are the same. The formations of birds and the birds are the same -- there's no "self," no boss involved.

There's a mental formation called vitarka, "initial thought." When we use the verb "to think" in English, we need a subject of the verb: I think, you think, he thinks. But, really, you don't need a subject for a thought to be produced. Thinking without a thinker -- it's absolutely possible. To think is to think about something. To perceive is to perceive something. The perceiver and the perceived object that is perceived are one.

When Descartes said, "I think, therefore I am," his point was that if I think, there must be an "I" for thinking to be possible. When he made the declaration "I think," he believed that he could demonstrate that the "I" exists. We have the strong habit or believing in a self. But, observing very deeply, we can see that a thought does not need a thinker to be possible. There is no thinker behind the thinking -- there is just the thinking; that's enough.

Now, if Mr. Descartes were here, we might ask him, "Monsieur Descartes, you say, 'You think, therefore you are.' But what are you? You are your thinking. Thinking -- that's enough. Thinking manifests without the need of a self behind it."

Thinking without a thinker. Feeling without a feeler. What is our anger without our 'self'? This is the object of our meditation. All the fifty-one mental formations take place and manifest without a self behind them arranging for this to appear, and then for that to appear. Our mind consciousness is in the habit of basing itself on the idea of self, on manas. But we can meditate to be more aware of our store consciousness, where we keep the seeds of all those mental formations that are not currently manifesting in our mind.

When we meditate, we practice looking deeply in order to bring light and clarity into our way of seeing things. When the vision of no-self is obtained, our delusion is removed. This is what we call transformation. In the Buddhist tradition, transformation is possible with deep understanding. The moment the vision of no-self is there, manas, the elusive notion of 'I am,' disintegrates, and we find ourselves enjoying, in this very moment, freedom and happiness."


......

"When we say I know the wind is blowing, we don't think that there is something blowing something else. "Wind' goes with 'blowing'. If there is no blowing, there is no wind. It is the same with knowing. Mind is the knower; the knower is mind. We are talking about knowing in relation to the wind. 'To know' is to know something. Knowing is inseparable from the wind. Wind and knowing are one. We can say, 'Wind,' and that is enough. The presence of wind indicates the presence of knowing, and the presence of the action of blowing'."

"..The most universal verb is the verb 'to be'': I am, you are, the mountain is, a river is. The verb 'to be' does not express the dynamic living state of the universe. To express that we must say 'become.' These two verbs can also be used as nouns: 'being", "becoming". But being what? Becoming what? 'Becoming' means 'evolving ceaselessly', and is as universal as the verb "to be." It is not possible to express the "being" of a phenomenon and its "becoming" as if the two were independent. In the case of wind, blowing is the being and the becoming...."



"In any phenomena, whether psychological, physiological, or physical, there is dynamic movement, life. We can say that this movement, this life, is the universal manifestation, the most commonly recognized action of knowing. We must not regard 'knowing' as something from the outside which comes to breathe life into the universe. It is the life of the universe itself. The dance and the dancer are one."



——

Alan watts expressed well too: “From "The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are" by Alan Watts:

As soon as one sees that separate things are fictitious, it becomes obvious that nonexistent things cannot “perform” actions. The difficulty is that most languages are arranged so that actions (verbs) have to be set in motion by things (nouns), and we forget that rules of grammar are not necessarily rules, or patterns, of nature. This, which is nothing more than a convention of grammar, is also responsible for (or, better, “goeswith”) absurd puzzles as to how spirit governs matter, or mind moves body. How can a noun, which is by definition not action, lead to action?

Scientists would be less embarrassed if they used a language, on the model of Amerindian Nootka, consisting of verbs and adverbs, and leaving off nouns and adjectives. If we can speak of a house as housing, a mat as matting, or of a couch as seating, why can't we think of people as “peopling,” of brains as “braining,” or of an ant as an “anting?” Thus in the Nootka language a church is “housing religiously,” a shop is “housing tradingly,” and a home is “housing homely.” Yet we are habituated to ask, “Who or what is housing? Who peoples? What is it that ants?” Yet isn't it obvious that when we say, “The lightning flashed,” the flashing is the same as the lightning, and that it would be enough to say, “There was lightning”? Everything labeled with a noun is demonstrably a process or action, but language is full of spooks, like the “it” in “It is raining,” which are the supposed causes, of action.



Does it really explain running to say that “A man is running”? On the contrary, the only explanation would be a description of the field or situation in which “a manning goeswith running” as distinct from one in which “a manning goeswith sitting.” (I am not recommending this primitive and clumsy form of verb language for general and normal use. We should have to contrive something much more elegant.) Furthermore, running is not something other than myself, which I (the organism) do. For the organism is sometimes a running process, sometimes a standing process, sometimes a sleeping process, and so on, and in each instance the “cause” of the behavior is the situation as a whole, the organism/environment. Indeed, it would be best to drop the idea of causality and use instead the idea of relativity.

For it is still inexact to say that an organism “responds” or “reacts” to a given situation by running or standing, or whatever. This is still the language of Newtonian billiards. It is easier to think of situations as moving patterns, like organisms themselves. Thus, to go back to the cat (or catting), a situation with pointed ears and whiskers at one end does not have a tail at the other as a response or reaction to the whiskers, or the claws, or the fur. As the Chinese say, the various features of a situation “arise mutually” or imply one another as back implies front, and as chickens imply eggs—and vice versa. They exist in relation to each other like the poles of the magnet, only more complexly patterned.



Moreover, as the egg/chicken relation suggests, not all the features of a total situation have to appear at the same time. The existence of a man implies parents, even though they may be long since dead, and the birth of an organism implies its death. Wouldn't it be as farfetched to call birth the cause of death as to call the cat's head the cause of the tail? Lifting the neck of a bottle implies lifting the bottom as well, for the “two parts” come up at the same time. If I pick up an accordion by one end, the other will follow a little later, but the principle is the same. Total situations are, therefore, patterns in time as much as patterns in space.

And, right now is the moment to say that I am not trying to smuggle in the “total situation” as a new disguise for the old “things” which were supposed to explain behavior or action. The total situation or field is always open-ended, for

Little fields have big fields

Upon their backs to bite 'em,

And big fields have bigger fields

And so ad infinitum. 



We can never, never describe all the features of the total situation, not only because every situation is infinitely complex, but also because the total situation is the universe. Fortunately, we do not have to describe any situation exhaustively, because some of its features appear to be much more important than others for understanding the behavior of the various organisms within it. We never get more than a sketch of the situation, yet this is enough to show that actions (or processes) must be understood, or explained, in terms of situations just as words must be understood in the context of sentences, paragraphs, chapters, books, libraries, and … life itself.

To sum up: just as no thing or organism exists on its own, it does not act on its own. Furthermore, every organism is a process: thus the organism is not other than its actions. To put it clumsily: it is what it does. More precisely, the organism, including its behavior, is a process which is to be understood only in relation to the larger and longer process of its environment. For what we mean by “understanding” or “comprehension” is seeing how parts fit into a whole, and then realizing that they don't compose the whole, as one assembles a jigsaw puzzle, but that the whole is a pattern, a complex wiggliness, which has no separate parts. Parts are fictions of language, of the calculus of looking at the world through a net which seems to chop it up into bits. Parts exist only for purposes of figuring and describing, and as we figure the world out we become confused if we do not remember this all the time.”


John tan replied “He is so gifted in expressing anatta and his insights, so clear.”"

Thanks!

Here's more on Nagarjuna, Madhyamaka and No Agent by Dzogchen teacher Acarya Malcolm Smith:

partial quotations from https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2020/06/choosing.html 

Also, an enlightening conversation recently (thankfully with permission from Arcaya Malcolm to share this) in Arcaya Malcolm's facebook group:
"[Participant 1]
June 14 at 2:40 PM

I came across a passage in a book I'm reading which brings up how Nagarjuna often bases arguments on unstated and unproven premises and manipulates ambiguities in language to justify his arguments leading to criticisms of sophistry. How do later authors address this if they do at all?

One example from chap 3 of the MMK with the following 3 arguments:

"Vision cannot in anyway see itself. Now if it cannot see itself, how can it see other things?

"The example of fire is not adequate to establish vision. These have been refuted with the analysis of movement, past, future, and present" - refers to the refutation from chap 2

"When no vision occurs there is nothing to be called visions. How then can it be said: vision sees?"

The book brings up the following critcism respectively:

This is based on the assumption for objects to have certain functions it needs to apply the function to itself but this is not justified. A counter example being lamps illuminate themselves and others.

The argument from chap 2 depends on natural functions (movement, burning of fire, seeing of the eye, etc.) being predicated on the moment of time which it takes place, and when the non obtaining of time is established it leads to the non happening of the function. This is not justified.

Here Nagarjuna jumps from how seeing only occurs with a sense object to the occlusion the eye faculty can't see. The author distinguishes between "seeing independent of condition" and "seeing dependent of condition" so Nagarjuna really only negates the first one. And that negating the first is close to pointless since no one asserts seeing occurs irrespective of condition. The second is left alone.
6[...] and 5 others
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    [Participant 2] What book is this from?
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    [Participant 1] Madhyamaka in China, the author was giving some background on Nagarjuna.
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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith Lamps do not illuminate themselves. Candrakirti shows this.
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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith Nāgārjuna is addressing the realist proposition, "the six senses perceive their objects because those sense and their objects intrinsically exist ." It is not his unstated premise, that is the purvapakṣa, the premise of the opponent. The opponent, in verse 1 of this chapter asserts the essential existence of the six āyatanas. The opponent is arguing that perception occurs because the objects of perception actually exist.
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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith [Participant 1] "The argument from chap 2 depends on natural functions (movement, burning of fire, seeing of the eye, etc.) being predicated on the moment of time which it takes place, and when the non obtaining of time is established it leads to the non happening of the function. This is not justified."

Why?

Nāgārjuna shows two things in chapter two, one, he says that if there is a moving mover, this separates the agent from the action, and either the mover is not necessary or the moving is not necessary. It is redundant.

In common language we oftren saying things like "There is a burning fire." But since that is what a fire is (burning) there is no separate agent which is doing the burning, fire is burning.

On the other hand, when an action is not performed, no agent of that action can be said to exist. This is why he says "apart from something which has moved and has not moved, there is no moving mover." There is no mover with moving, etc.

This can be applied to all present tense gerundial agentive constructions, such as I am walking to town, the fire is burning, etc.
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 [Participant 3] Malcolm Smith these are not agentive constructions, they are unaccusative (cf. "byed med") verbs, so of course no separate agent can be established. So what?

The example of the fire and the eye are likewise not convincing, because they just happen to describe natural functions, but this is not all that unaccusative verbs do. When you say "the cat falls down", you cannot say that "falling down" is what a cat "is", the same way you can with fire burning.

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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith [Participant 3] the point is aimed at the notion that there has to be a falling faller, a seeing seer, etc. it is fine to say there is a falling cat, but stupid to say the cat is a falling faller. The argument is aimed at that sort of naive premise.

For example, if eyes could see forms by nature, they should be able to forms in absence of an object of form, and so on.

But if the sight of forms cannot be found in the eyes, and not in the object, nor the eye consciousness, then none of them are sufficient to explain the act of seeing. Because of this, statements like the eyes are seers is just a convention, but isn’t really factual.

And it still applies in this way, apart from what has been seen and not been seen, there is no present seeing.
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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith Any people make the mistake of thinking that nag has an obligation to do more than just deconstruct the purpaksa.
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[Participant 1] Malcolm Smith thank you, definitely clears it up

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Soh Wei Yu
Soh Wei Yu Malcolm Smith What is purpaksa?

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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith purva means "prior", pakṣa" means postion
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Malcolm SmithActive Now
Malcolm Smith meaning, "the opponent's position."
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Malcolm Smith Purvapaksa
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- From his facebook group Ask the Ācārya https://www.facebook.com/groups/387338435166650/
Description
Who this group is for: people who wish to ask Ācārya Malcolm Smith questions about Dharma etc., and to converse with like-minded people. Being admitted to this group carries a commitment not to share content outside of the group.

Who this group is not for: People with pseudonyms; people who think one can practice Dzogchen, Mahāmudra, etc. without a guru; people who think psychedelics are useful on the Buddhist path; people who think they can mix Buddhadharma with nonbuddhist paths, etc.
Also, more by Malcolm:

[10:51 PM, 10/17/2019] Soh Wei Yu: malcolm (Arcaya Malcolm Smith) wrote:


https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=77&t=30365&p=479718&hilit=AGENT#p479718

There is no typing typer, no learning learner, no digesting digester, thinking tinker, or driving driver.

...

No, a falling faller does not make any sense. As Nāgārjuna would put it, apart from snow that has fallen or has not fallen, presently there is no falling.

...


 It is best if you consult the investigation into movement in the MMK, chapter two. This is where it is shown that agents are mere conventions. If one claims there is agent with agency, one is claiming the agent and the agency are separate. But if you claim that agency is merely a characteristic of an agent, when agent does not exercise agency, it isn't an agent since an agent that is not exercising agency is in fact a non-agent. Therefore, rather than agency being dependent on an agent, an agent is predicated upon exercising agency. For example, take movement. If there is an agent there has to be a moving mover. But there is no mover when there is no moving. Apart from moving, how could there be a mover? But when there is moving, there isn't a mover which is separate from moving. Even movement itself cannot be ascertained until there has been a movement. When there is no movement, there is no agent of movement. When there is moving, there is no agent of moving that can be ascertained to be separate from the moving. And since even moving cannot be ascertained without there either having been movement or not, moving itself cannot be established. Since moving cannot be established, a moving mover cannot be established. If a moving mover cannot be established, an agent cannot be established.

...

 Hi Wayfarer:

The key to understanding everything is the term "dependent designation." We don't question the statement "I am going to town." In this there are three appearances, for convenience's sake, a person, a road, and a destination.

A person is designated on the basis of the aggregates, but there is no person in the aggregates, in one of the aggregates, or separate from the aggregates. Agreed? A road is designated in dependence on its parts, agreed? A town s designated upon its parts. Agreed?

If you agree to this, then you should have no problem with the following teaching of the Buddha in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra:

This body arises from various conditions, but lacks a self. This body is like the earth, lacking an agent. This body is like water, lacking a self. This body is like fire, lacking a living being. This body is like the wind, lacking a person. This body is like space, lacking a nature. This body is the place of the four elements, but is not real. This body that is not a self nor pertains to a self is empty.

In other words, when it comes to the conventional use of language, Buddha never rejected statements like "When I was a so and so in a past life, I did so and so, and served such and such a Buddha." Etc. But when it comes to what one can discern on analysis, if there is no person, no self, etc., that exists as more than a mere designation, the fact that agents cannot be discerned on analysis should cause no one any concern. It is merely a question of distinguishing between conventional use of language versus the insight into the nature of phenomena that results from ultimate analysis.



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[11:36 PM, 10/17/2019] John Tan: Yes should put in blog together with Alan watt article about language causing confusion.


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From other threads:

https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=39&t=26272&p=401986&hilit=agent#p401986

There is no "experiencer" since there is no agent. There is merely experience, and all experience is empty.

https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=102&t=24265&start=540


Why should there be someone upon whom karma ripens? To paraphrase the Visuddhimagga, there is no agent of karma, nor is there a person to experience its ripening, there is merely a flow of dharmas.


...

There are no agents. There are only actions. This is covered in the refutation of moving movers in chapter two of the MMK.

...

https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=116&t=26495&p=406369&hilit=agent#p406369

 The point is that there is no point to eternalism if there is no eternal agent or object.


...

https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=52&t=16306&p=277352&hilit=mover+movement+agent#p277352

 Things have no natures, conventionally or otherwise. Look, we can say water is wet, but actually, there no water that possesses a wet nature. Water is wet, that is all. There is no wetness apart from water and not water apart from wetness. If you say a given thing has a separate nature, you are making the exact mistaken Nāgārajuna points out in the analysis of movement, i.e., it is senseless to say there is a "moving mover." Your arguments are exactly the same, you are basically saying there is an "existing existence."

...

This is precisely because of the above point I referenced. Nagārjuna clearly shows that characteristics/natures are untenable.

Candrakīrti points out that the possessor does not exist at all, but for the mere purpose of discourse, we allow conventionally the idea that there is a possessor of parts even though no possessor of parts exists. This mistake that we indulge in can act as an agent, for example a car, we can use it as such, but it is empty of being a car — an agent is as empty of being an agent as its actions are empty of being actions. 



...

Wait, 


!! ;) 

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We need Karma Police! Pronto!!! 911!!!